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SCHOLARSHIP AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES
Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global
Governance
Ann Florini
Brookings Institution and National University of Singapore
International Relations (IR) scholarship is directly in the path of two
simultaneous tidal waves. The first is the rise of China and India in the
traditional IR terms of military and economic power. The second is the
expanding nature of what IR scholarship needs to address, as global
integration transforms the nature of the issues to be addressed and
numerous trends expand the number and types of relevant actors.
Neither theory nor practice is yet coping well with the profound impli-
cations of these fundamental changes. Investigating what kind of a
world order might emerge from these two simultaneous tsunamis will
require an enormous research agenda that explores the roles of ideas,
structural factors, and path dependencies across regions and issue areas.
This article aims to illuminate a subset focused around the connection
between theory and practice as related to two emerging powers. It
briefly maps developments in Western IR theory and explores how
those connect—or fail to connect—with intellectual and policy currents
in the rising Asian giants. It draws on a number of interviews and work-
shops held in Asia in the past two years that explore how Asian scholars
and policymakers are dealing with, and perhaps beginning to shape,
the rapidly changing conceptual landscape.
Two key and simultaneous developments are shattering international theory and
politics alike. First, the accelerating shift of power within the international state
system, especially toward China and to a lesser extent India, raises questions
about how those emerging actors will define their interests and what behaviors
they will consider appropriate. An analysis of how these powers are explicitly or
implicitly adopting the assumptions of various theoretical perspectives can shed
light on some of those concerns. Second, the rapidly growing field of global gov-
ernance, which investigates the broad range of efforts related to the need to
address global-scale collective action problems in a world lacking a global govern-
ment, is challenging existing paradigms of international relations (IR) theory.
With regard to the first, Western scholars and policymakers are struggling to
internalize just how emphatically—and quickly—China has burst forth as a major
power. A world that a decade ago seemed firmly in the grip of the American uni-
polar moment is now a world where progress in arenas from economic stability
to environmental protection to development assistance requires China’s consent
and usually its active participation. Moreover, China’s and increasingly India’s
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relative economic and to some degree geopolitical success over the past decade,
standing in stark contrast to the various fiascoes of the Bush administration and
the Western-led economic implosion of the past few years, has engendered a
striking mood of Asian triumphalism. That mood ensures that key Asian govern-
ments, especially China and India, are increasingly disinclined to be willing to
continue as rule-takers rather than rule-makers in the international system. But
it is not yet evident what rules they are likely to want to make, or what concep-
tual frameworks they will bring to the table, making it difficult to determine
whether or in what ways a power shift to Asia would change the nature of world
order.
The rise of the Asian giants is complicated by the fact that the shift of power
within the interstate system is happening at the same time that global integration
is rapidly changing the nature of the issues that need to be addressed, while
trends from democratization to information technology are widening the range
of types of actors trying to address those issues. We are seeing not just major
shifts in authority within the state system, but also growing needs for more
authority to cope with an explosion of complex, border-crossing problems, and
to some degree the re-location of authority out of state hands altogether.
Neither theory nor practice is yet coping well with the profound implications
of these fundamental changes. Investigating what kind of a world order might
emerge from these two simultaneous tsunamis will require an enormous research
agenda that explores the roles of ideas, structural factors, and path dependencies
across regions and issue areas. This article aims to illuminate a subset focused
around the connection between theory and practice as related to two emerging
powers. It briefly maps developments in Western IR theory and explores how
those connect—or fail to connect—with intellectual and policy currents in the
rising Asian giants. It draws on a number of interviews and workshops held in
Asia in the past 2 years that explore how Asian scholars and policymakers are
dealing with, and perhaps beginning to shape, the rapidly changing conceptual
landscape.
Theories of International Relations and Global Governance
The study of IR has always been a complex, multi-faceted, ill-defined field, draw-
ing from numerous theoretical traditions to study an enormous range of phe-
nomena that share only one characteristic: something about them crosses
national borders. Unfortunately, for those IR graduate students who have not yet
passed comprehensive examinations, the complexity is getting worse. It is no
longer enough to master the familiar state-centric theories. Instead, students,
professors, and policymakers alike confront a variegated landscape of competing
claims to authority and legitimacy across territories, issues, and rule systems.
The following quick overview of selected strands of IR theory provides a basis
for considering the range of conceptual frameworks that may influence the intel-
lectual and policy communities in China and India.
Realism
Most familiar to students of IR are the tenets of realism (including the many
variants of neo-realism). These are focused around issues of war and conflict in
what is assumed to be an inherently anarchical and entirely state-centric interna-
tional system. Realists generally share the assumptions that states must be con-
cerned primarily with the prospects for relative gains and losses of power and
that cooperation across states occurs primarily in temporary and shifting alli-
ances against common threats from other states (e.g., Waltz 1979; Jervis 1978;
Mearsheimer 2001). Such core assumptions would lead policymakers in rising
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China and India to be concerned primarily with the prospects for conflict with
existing major powers, and it appears that realist tenets do have an impact on
their thinking.
Liberalism
Liberalism focuses on prospects for interstate cooperation that can lead to
mutual benefit. It analyzes the incentives behind such cooperation and investi-
gates how states build rule systems that produce mutual benefit (Keohane 1990;
Deudney and Ikenberry 1999). Liberal theorists generally accept the realist
insights into the potential for conflict and competition but argue that not all
games need to be zero-sum. States can and do bind themselves in meaningful
systems in which major powers constrain their own short-term freedom of action
to achieve longer-term benefits. Liberal theorists emphasize the need for struc-
tures to, as Keohane (1984) has argued, lower transaction costs and overcome
information asymmetries.
However, this cooperative, rule-based order is not easily understood separately
from the ruled-based, open nature of the domestic regimes of the hegemonic
states that have developed it—the United Kingdom and the United States. A key
question for the twenty-first century is whether a truly global liberal order has
become a compelling and widely shared vision that can incorporate major pow-
ers whose domestic regimes are of a different nature, or whether that system of
order now faces new competition from an emerging Chinese model of state-led
capitalism and domestic authoritarianism (Bremmer 2010). It is also not clear to
what extent India, with its vast underclass, will accept international rules that
may undermine domestic policies aimed at protecting the poor.
Constructivism
Constructivism, the most recent contender in mainstream IR theory, shares the
realist and liberal assertions about the state-centric nature of the international
system, but problematizes the issues of interest formation (Wendt 1992; Finne-
more 1996; Ruggie 1998). Constructivists contend that the realist and liberal
assumptions about state interests are so broad and vague that they reveal little
about how states will behave in specific cases. Although there is little evidence
of constructivism appearing explicitly in the frameworks of Chinese or Indian
policymakers, this literature features prominently in the works translated into
Mandarin in the past two decades, and some leading Chinese IR scholars iden-
tify themselves as constructivists. Conversely, some of the most interesting analy-
sis coming out of the West on China includes Johnston’s (2007) fascinating
analysis of socialization processes that may be moderating concerns about
preserving sovereignty among some Chinese officials who participate in inter-
national institutions.
Global Governance
Global governance thinking, in contrast to conventional IR theory, generally
starts from the perspective of a particular border-crossing issue or set of issues,
without necessarily making a priori assumptions about which types of actors will
have effective and ⁄or legitimate roles in responding to that issue (Simmons and
De Jonge Oudraat 2001; Florini 2005). Much of the literature flows from con-
cerns about whether humanity can survive a host of border-crossing threats—not
only war or economic instability but also pandemics, environmental devastation,
and the like—and how it may reorganize in response to new opportunities for
economic and social progress. Where IR theory has generally assumed that
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responses to such threats necessary come overwhelmingly from states organized
in Westphalian sovereign units, global governance theorists are much more will-
ing to explore a wide range of sources of authority.
In so doing, they often refute the conventional theories’ insistence that a nearly
exclusive focus on states suffices to explain international outcomes. Instead, they
draw attention to a new range of issues, actors, and authority structures that are
emerging in response to these threats and opportunities. Institutionally, the world
is experimenting with a vast range of transnational mechanisms, from networks
and partnerships to regulations and law. States remain dominant, but the role of
nonstate entities, from private companies to civil society organizations, and
partnerships and networks between and within them, can no longer be ignored.
In these ways, global governance theory goes beyond considering how regimes
of ‘‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures’’ among states
(Krasner 1983), regime complexes of multiple and overlapping regimes
(Raustiala and Victor 2004), and institutional interplay (Young, Bradnee Cham-
bers, Kim, and ten Have 2008) provide, or fail to provide, systems of order and
governance that extend beyond national borders.
Increasingly, both bodies of theory—IR and global governance—share an
explicit concern with identifying and locating sources of authority and the
changing nature of state sovereignty. Indeed, some of the same scholars who
have contributed to the development of the above mainstream theories are
among those calling most vociferously for a rethinking of IR theory to take
account of these authority shifts. David Lake used the occasion of his Presiden-
tial address at the 2010 Annual Convention of the International Studies Associa-
tion to argue that the core concept of state-centric theory—sovereignty—should
be treated as an endogenous variable rather than an exogenous reality and that
all of IR should be a component part of a broader investigation of governance
(Lake 2010; see also Lake 2007). Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010) recently
spearheaded a project examining global governors—who creates issues, sets
agendas, establishes and implements rules and programs, and evaluates ⁄adjudi-
cates outcomes? Why are they the governors, what is the basis of their authority,
what outcomes do they produce, and what are the relationships among them
and between them and the governed? Slaughter’s (2004) analysis of cross-border
networks of related branches of governments (regulators, parliamentarians, and
judiciaries) has received widespread attention. And scores of works have
explored shifts of authority to nonstate actors in the secretariats of inter-govern-
mental organizations, civil society, and the private sector (see, e.g., Barnett and
Finnemore 2004; Buthe 2004; Culter, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Florini 2000,
2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Risse 1995).
A significant part of the global governance literature has a regulatory focus,
expanding beyond liberal notions of relatively voluntary interstate rule systems to
examine the emergence of more hierarchical authority structures (Jayasuriya
2005). Accompanying this interest is concern with the measures needed to
ensure fairness and legitimacy as well as efficacy in regulatory processes that are
not clearly accountable to national political processes, with an important litera-
ture emerging from the Global Administrative Law project spearheaded by New
York University (http://www.iilj.org/GAL/).
But conceptualizing, much less understanding, such fragmentation remains a
challenge. Globalization has increased the need for global governance, but the
cacophony of actors and mechanisms arising in part from efforts to govern glob-
alization has ironically made governance harder. New actors and mechanisms
create issues of legitimacy and representativeness and often fail to cohere into a
harmonious whole. The diversity and richness of ideas being put forth for better
global governance has not yet translated into actual creation and implementa-
tion of their effective forms.
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Transforming cacophony into harmony could occur in a variety of ways.
Hegemonic stability theory would contend that the world’s very diverse instru-
ments, in the form of states, must follow a score and be led by a conductor
whom everyone obeys. Those liberal theorists who examine ways of lowering
the transactions costs of international cooperation would focus on the roles of
inter-governmental organizations as the auditoriums and building staffs—they
provide the hall in which the players meet, and adequate heating and lighting,
but whether beautiful music results is entirely up to the players who hire the
hall. Global governance mechanisms could be seen as various types of jazz
ensembles, allowing for improvisation, but performing in the same agreed key
within the confines of an agreed general framework. Small combos might func-
tion on an egalitarian basis (reminiscent, perhaps, of regime theory, the G8, or
a variety of informal networks), while large jazz bands might still need a hege-
mon in the form of a conductor.
Unfortunately, much of global governance currently most resembles the music
of American composer Charles Ives. Ives, son of a US Army band leader, was
inspired by the experience of watching Fourth of July parades with multiple
marching bands parading around the central square of his hometown. Each
band individually played a more or less coherent tune, but the effect when
they all played at the same time was cacophony—or, as interpreted by Ives,
a significant addition to the musical canon.1
What instruments, ensembles, or tunes will India and China bring to the
global concert?
Connecting Theory and Policy in the Emerging Asian Giants2
Western-trained IR scholars increasingly speak easily, if not always clearly, of the
shifting conceptions of sovereignty, order, authority, and the need to redefine
them given the changes wrought by globalization. We readily use, and contest
the meaning of, such terms as governance, global governance, world order, and
architecture (Biermann, Pattberg, and van Asselt 2009). And we pay considerable
attention to how key institutions such as the UN may reshape thinking and
action on key global governance challenges (Weiss and Thakur 2010).
Leaders of major powers, however, resist such formal redefinition and seem
reluctant to change their mental maps, particularly when it comes to basic ques-
tions of the location of authority. It is not surprising that heads of national gov-
ernments continue to assert emphatically that both legitimate authority and
actual power remain in their hands, despite the claims of global governance
scholars otherwise.
Chinese and Indian discourse about the core concept of Westphalian sover-
eignty strongly asserts an absolutist definition of it based on inviolability, reci-
procity, and mutuality. Given the history of long periods of humiliating
1One theoretical approach that has yet to figure significantly in the IR literature but which may help to convert
cacophony into a modicum of musical sense, and thereby help answer Lake’s (2010) call for a broad theory of gov-
ernance, is the notion of polycentricity, introduced half a century ago by Vincent Ostrom and colleagues, in their
investigation of whether the existence of multiple public and private agencies with overlapping mandates to provide
public services in metropolitan areas led to conflict and chaos, or whether they found ways to interact and positively
function even in the absence of formalized cooperation or hierarchical coordination. In a recent interview, Ostrom
(2010) laid out the intellectual history of the institutionalist work that led to her Nobel prize, describing issues that
are familiar for scholars grappling with the conundrums of global issues whose management depends on the cumu-
lative activities of multiple actors.
2This section draws in part on the discussions at the Workshop on Concepts of Global Governance, held in con-
junction with the ‘‘Conference on Governance of a Globalising World: Whither Asia and the West?’’ (December
2008). The workshop brought together scholars and analysts from Asia, Europe, and North America to debate
the changing nature of sovereignty and world order, global governance, and the effectiveness and legitimacy of the
multitude of actors and mechanisms involved in managing the world’s most pressing global issues.
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subjugation to external powers, both countries are deeply suspicious of anything
that looks like an effort to undermine their hard-won autonomy. Chinese policy-
makers have backed up their vociferous insistence on a state-centric, sovereignty-
based world order with specific signals of displeasure at any interference with
that sovereignty. In 2008, for example, China cancelled its summit with the
European Union because of the alleged interference by French President
Nicholas Sarkozy in China’s internal affairs. In May 2010, President Hu (2010)
framed his opening address to the US–China Security and Economic Dialogue
with reference to a re-assertion of the fundamental role of sovereignty. ‘‘To the
Chinese people, nothing is more important than safeguarding national sover-
eignty and territorial integrity.’’
However, sovereignty is emphasized primarily with regard to issues related to
China’s conception of its territorial integrity. US arms sales to Taiwan or sugges-
tion that the outside world might have a legitimate say in how Tibet is governed
have always caused Chinese officials to bristle angrily. And China’s growing stature
is giving those officials increased confidence about objecting to such interference.
At the same time, however, China appears to be hewing closely to many liberal
prescriptions about the potential for advancing national interests via cooperation
in a rule-based order. It has taken significant steps toward incorporating itself
into this order, rather than challenging it (Ikenberry 2009). But the relatively
free-market system that the existing rules are meant to support may face compe-
tition from an emerging Chinese model of state-led capitalism and an authoritar-
ian system of domestic governance (Bremmer 2010). Moreover, China’s
domestic governance evolution is intensely pragmatic, focused around questions
of what works, in a fundamental shift from its previously ideology-based claim to
legitimacy. To be pragmatic at the national level and ideological abroad is an
inconsistency that may prove hard to maintain, given the near impossibility of
succeeding at the domestic level unless the processes of global governance
improve dramatically.
To a degree that has not yet been widely recognized in the West, China has
for the past two decades made concerted, and successful, efforts to develop
a much-enhanced capacity for IR scholarship (Qin 2007, 2009). Hundreds of
Chinese scholars have earned IR Ph.D.s in leading North American and Euro-
pean universities, and a large number of key Western IR texts have been trans-
lated into Mandarin. Numerous workshops and conferences have brought
together Western and Chinese IR scholars in recent years to begin building
bridges. Yet, the number of articles available in English by Chinese IR scholars
remains relatively small. The relative paucity of English-language output cur-
rently makes it difficult to assess from that literature alone how the conceptual
debate is progressing within China’s IR community.
A series of research interviews conducted with leading Chinese international
relations scholars beginning in 2008 has provided some insights.3 These inter-
views demonstrated a general consensus that China is not ready to play a sub-
stantially greater role in global governance, either in developing theory and new
thinking, or in the policy arena. The academics held mixed views about the state
of Chinese IR theory. One described the landscape as a ‘‘big forest’’ without
internal coherence, generally dependent on structures drawn from Western
sources. Another argued that there is potential for the development of a Chinese
world view based on a web of relationships as an alternative to the Westphalian
state-centric approach, but acknowledged such development has not yet hap-
pened. Several noted that political science in China is focused primarily on
studying Chinese experiences. However, the scholarly community is well ahead
of the government in the willingness to discuss global governance issues.
3These interviews were conducted with Yeling Tan.
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In explaining why they thought China was not ready for a bigger role in the
world, various academics suggested that China remains focused on internal eco-
nomic development—a point that is revealing of key assumptions. The underlying
premise seems to be that the responsibilities of global governance are separate
from the priorities of national development and that such responsibilities should
be assumed only after a country has reached a certain degree of national strength.
They also tended to think of global governance in terms of inter-governmental
organizations and Bretton Woods-type arrangements, rather than alternative
arrangements such as networks of regulators or ‘‘multi-stakeholder’’ networks. Not
surprising, if that bigger role is equated with the role that the United States has
been playing since 1945—that of a global stabilizer and dominant player in inter-
governmental organizations and regimes, with commensurate investment in
human and financial resources—a country with China’s massive internal needs
and relatively low per capita income would indeed be severely challenged to take
it up.
Despite the relatively nascent stage of Chinese IR theory development and the
government’s defensive assertions about the inviolable nature of sovereignty, the
interviews made clear that there is ample room for engaging Chinese scholars
and policymakers about China’s role in global governance, by discussing specific
issue areas. China faces the challenge of engaging intellectually and practically
with its substantially altered position in the world, at the same time that many of
the conditions under which the traditional notions of world order evolved are
changing dramatically. The same leaders who are insisting on sovereignty also
face immense pressures to deal with practical problems that readily disrupt any
absolutist ideas. That is why several interviewees noted that when it comes to
pragmatic problem solving, the Chinese government might well be willing to
make ‘‘discounts on sovereignty,’’ as one leading scholar put it, on a case by case
basis in specific issue areas.
While China has clearly set out to develop the capacity to engage on an equal
basis with Western IR intellectual communities, India finds itself in a quite differ-
ent situation. Despite the substantial numbers of important IR scholars of Indian
origin in leading departments in many countries, within India itself there are
major problems with tertiary education in all but a few pockets of excellence.
The international studies (IS) and IR fields are in particularly poor shape.
In the carefully nuanced language of the organizer of a recent workshop (held
in Singapore) on the state of the field within India:
International studies in India, however, have not kept pace with the changing
scope and content of India’s IR that now must address a new set of challenges,
threats, and opportunities in a wide range of domains including economics
(trade, investment, finance), climate change, security (traditional and non-tradi-
tional), and regional and global governance. Despite a strong beginning in the
early decades after independence, IS programmes and institutions in India are
not fully able to meet the changing and complex demands facing the country.
In comparative terms, India, which had the more developed IS programmes and
institutions in Asia, has fallen behind East Asian countries, particularly China.
This is an unanticipated development in light of India’s many advantages—an
open society, freedom of thought and expression, and competence in the Eng-
lish Language, etc. (Alagappa 2009, p. 7).4
The workshop’s cochair expressed concern about the impact of this lack of
capacity for India’s ability to become a producer of knowledge in this field and
thereby to successfully engage with the world:
4The workshop was framed broadly in terms of IS, including IR, comparative politics, international political
economy, international economics, business and law, world history, and geography.
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…India’s self-image has been constructed around having a distinct view of its
relation to the outside world. In what sense will India be different from the ris-
ing powers of the past? What new strategic innovations will it bring to the world?
How will it contribute to solving a whole series of global deadlocks? The world is
looking to India to provide answers to these questions. But it is hard to imagine
India being able to take on its historical responsibilities if it does not have a proper
research and academic base on subjects of vital importance (Mehta 2009, p. 9).
As one prominent Indian IR scholar, Kanti Bajpai (2009), has noted, despite
some notable improvements in IR capacity over the past decade or two, India
has been outpaced by Asia’s other major powers. By and large India’s IR schol-
arly community has chosen not to engage with the Western-dominated IR com-
munities, with relatively few going abroad for training and then returning, and
even fewer foreigners coming to India to teach political science or IR (Bajpai
2009; see also Bajpai 1997 regarding the historical development of IS within
India). He contends that the country faces significant obstacles to developing a
rich and flourishing culture of IR research.
One such obstacle is the absence of clearly defined puzzles that attract the
attention of scholars. IR theory develops in response to questions that need
answers—what strategies could ensure that the Cold War did not turn into a hot
war? How to understand international political economy in the context of the
end of the original Bretton Woods system? How can major powers or other
actors address planetary scale environmental externalities that can threaten
civilization? In India, Bajpai argues, appropriate puzzles have yet to be clearly
identified to create a strong research agenda. The range of global governance
challenges and the wide range of approaches to addressing them may increas-
ingly appeal to Indian scholars, as India (like China before it) finds itself under
ever more intense pressures to engage on the global governance agenda.
The other key obstacle that Bajpai identifies is what he calls ‘‘the neglect of
theory,’’ resulting in research that tends to be richly descriptive rather than sys-
tematically analytical. He contends that the lack of theory has meant that India’s
focus on ‘‘relational studies’’—India’s relations with other countries—has ‘‘not
added up to any very interesting prepositions about the overall conduct on
Indian foreign policy’’ (Bajpai 2009, p. 114).
To the degree that this characterization of India’s current capacity and con-
straints is correct, it is possible to identify ways to encourage a more effective
engagement between Indian scholars and those outside, keeping in mind that sig-
nificant changes in Indian academe will and should remain the responsibility of
scholars within the country. That said, foreign scholars—and policymakers—have
clear incentives to encourage India’s engagement on major questions of world
order and the management of global issues. It is in everyone’s interest to consider
how to support the development of a rich and flourishing culture of academic
departments and think tanks with expertise appropriate to India’s growing stature
and the increasingly urgent need to engage India in the broader debates over
global governance. With regard to theory, as China demonstrates an increasingly
impressive capacity to engage in rigorous development and application of IR
theory, the attitude Bajpai describes in India may change. And those of us raised
in Western traditions will need to be open to ideas that may emerge from the
different contexts of the two Asian giants.
What Next?
Virtually, every concept associated with IR theory is contested. This is nothing
new—everyone in the discipline has experienced the joys of trying to impose
conceptual coherence on a stubbornly resistant literature. But the nature of the
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contestation is changing. As scholars and policymakers struggle to find workable
conceptual bases for world order in the twenty-first century, the very status of IR
as a separate discipline has come into question. Globalization, both by deliberate
action and as unintended consequence of technology and the sheer scale of
human impact on the planet, has demonstrably increased the need for border-
crossing rule systems and coordination. Those same trends have also made possi-
ble the explosion of roles for a variety of nonstate mechanisms and actors to
compensate for an increasingly inadequate state-centric system. The concepts
that increasingly animate debate over the management of the world are the same
as those long familiar in debates over domestic governance—transparency,
accountability, participation, democracy.
China and India are thus being drawn into debates whose contours are very
poorly defined. The most fundamental principles and issues are in question—what
does sovereignty mean, and under what conditions does and should it vary? Which
actors have legitimate say in making the rules that govern the world, and on what
claim to legitimacy? Is there consensus around the nature of the international
economic system that cross-border cooperation should aim to support, or do
we face new debates between open liberal systems and a model based on state
capitalism?
The days when Western, and particularly American, intellectuals and policy-
makers could set the terms for the debates over IR and the management of glo-
bal issues are over. What their counterparts in China and India think, and
choose to think about, will matter enormously to the future of world order. This
article is meant to provide preliminary impetus to a much broader discussion
between Asia and the West.
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